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Abstract: The New Zealand Internet Party tested key notions of affective media politics. 
Embracing techno-solutionism and the hacker politics of disruption, Kim Dotcom’s party 
attempted to mobilise the youth vote through an irreverent politics of lulz. While an electoral 
failure, the party’s political discourse offers insights into affective media ontology. The social 
character of affective media creates the political conditions for an antagonistic political 
discourse. In this case affective identification in the master signifier “The Internet” creates a 
community of enjoyment, threatened by the enemy of state surveillance as an agent of 
rapacious jouissance. The Internet Party’s politics of lulz was cast as a left-wing techno-fix to 
democracy, but this rhetoric belied a politics of cyberlibertarianism. Dotcom’s political 
intervention attempted to conflate his private interests as a battle that elevates him to the 
status of cyberlibertarian super-hero in the mould of Edward Snowden or Julian Assange.  
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1. Introduction 
From across the political spectrum and in critical scholarly circles, affective media 
(namely, collaborative Web 2.0 technologies) are seen as a fix for the crisis of 
democracy. The potential for uninhibited communication, connectivity and creativity 
offers a new and previously unimaginable emancipatory potential. Affective media 
practices are held as a transformative form of politics prefiguring the new society. 
Whether trading in digital currencies, using encrypted message services or 
conducting virtual general assemblies, this new activism toolkit bypasses traditional 
control mechanisms. Across both progressive and right-wing social media spaces 
there is a teleology of open-source democracy that tracks very closely to techno-
futurist and utopian corporate rhetoric. Transformation is deemed rhizomatic; the 
Internet enables an affective humanity and “new social practices” which, in a post-
political twist, “[upend] the ideological divide between individualism and collectivism” 
(Coleman 2014, 49-50).   
This article focuses on the political potential of affective media, considering the 
emergence of the New Zealand Internet Party (IP) as a concrete intervention of 
affective media politics. The IP was founded by the pirate capitalist, hacker and the 
“lulzy” 1  Internet mogul Kim Dotcom. Dotcom emerged as a political symbol of 
resistance to John Key’s right-wing National Party government (Vance 2013). In 
2013, Dotcom was a prominent voice opposing an amendment to the GCSB bill 
which expanded the Government Communications Security Bureau’s powers of 
                                            
1 “Lulz” or “the lulz” is a play on the ubiquitous Internet “LOL”. Coleman (2014) describes the lulz as a 
devotion to the carnivalesque above all else and a key marker of subcultural interiority from 4-Chan to  
the hacker collective Anonymous. 
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surveillance (which had previously been used illegally against him). Following the 
bill’s passage, Dotcom formed the IP. Officially designated “party visionary”, Dotcom 
spent almost $5 million NZD (One News 2015) on the party and made a list-sharing 
alliance with the radical indigenous leftist Mana Party. The IP positioned itself as the 
realisation of the Internet’s political potential against the Key government’s attack on 
innovation, civil liberties and capitulation to American interests. The party itself was to 
use the Internet to redefine political participation, energising youthful netizens and 
the marginalised. 
While the IP proved an electoral failure, its discourse offers insights into the 
political potential and limits of affective media politics. This article draws on the 
discourse theory of Laclau (2005) and the Lacanian Marxism of Žižek (1997, 2006 
and 2008) and Dean (2009, 2010 and 2016) to consider affect as a political logic. 
The predominant theories of affect in new media contexts privilege a Deleuzian 
reading of affect as inherently social, connective and productive. This article will 
argue that affective connectivity draws political subjects into libidinal drives and the 
inter-subjective dynamics of enjoyment.  
Laclau’s notion of populism is premised on the affective investment in a name 
such as “Internet Party” which is accompanied by floating signifiers that affirm identity 
and enjoyment while dividing the social space between the Internet and its enemies. 
The IP embodies the dialectic in affective media politics between a self-replicating 
techno-fetishism and a politics of transgressive enjoyment or “jouissance” (Žižek 
1997). The result is the displacement of politics: either into communities pursuing 
jouissance for its own ends, or into circular techno-fixes which relieve us of “the guilt 
that we might not be doing our part” (Dean 2009, 37-38). In terms of the IP this 
manifests itself as faith in the Internet as an ideological and organisational principle, 
to the politics of jouissance where the movement is bonded in trolling John Key as an 
overdetermined enemy. Within these contours of techno-fetishism and jouissance, 
affective media offers no emancipatory shortcuts. 
Where affective media does present a radical opening to the political is with the 
project of cyberlibertarianism (Golumbia 2013). The Internet is conceived as a digital 
frontier with infinite potential for personal and commercial freedom but for the 
interference of “paternalistic authoritarian systems” (Dahlberg 2010, 337). Battles for 
Internet freedom invoke the commons while realising the neo-liberal digital 
autonomous subject. Cyberlibertarianism offers the left a critique of corporate 
inauthenticity and alienation, which informs the anarcho-capitalism of the sharing 
economy and the more radical anti-statism of Bitcoin. 
Dotcom’s political intervention conflated his own interests with ‘the Internet’ as an 
object of affective investment, while he battled the forces that would stifle innovation: 
the global spying infrastructure and the ‘Copyright Cartel’. The key moment in the 
IP’s campaign which captured this logic was the “Moment of Truth” (MOT) spectacle. 
This carefully stage-managed event enlisted cyberlibertarian heroes Glenn 
Greenwald, Julian Assange and Edward Snowden to both reveal John Key’s 
corruption and at the same time launch Dotcom’s “Skype-killer” Megachat. This 
hacker-inspired political intervention reveals that behind teleologies of affective 
connectivity and tech-fetishism there lie libertarian notions of cyberspace which 
conflate digital freedom with the interests of tech-capital. 
2. The Internet Party 
Before proceeding it is necessary to explain the particular political context that 
created the IP. While the IP has not had the success of other Internet-inspired parties 
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like the Five Star Movement in Italy or the Iceland Pirate Party, it is exemplary of the 
confluence of libertarian and left-wing discourses in affective media politics. The IP 
was founded by Kim Dotcom, a former hacker and Internet mogul who gained 
notoriety for his file-sharing service Megaupload, which hosted movies. Dotcom’s 
story became central to New Zealand politics in 2012 with a dramatic raid on his 
home by the New Zealand government at the behest of the FBI, who sought his 
extradition on charges of mass copyright infringement. It was subsequently revealed 
that Dotcom, who was fast-tracked for residency as an investor, was illegally 
monitored by New Zealand intelligence officials. Prime Minister Key, as minister of 
the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), was forced to apologise 
to Dotcom. With the revelations from Edward Snowden in 2013 and Key’s attempts to 
expand the powers of the GCSB, the Dotcom case became central in politicising New 
Zealand’s involvement in the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence alliance.  
Dotcom announced the formation of his party in 2014 with an emphasis on 
“techno-solutionism” (Morozov 2014) that did not betray his class interests. And while 
the IP’s emphasis on innovation and technology would be right at home in the 
campaign of a neoliberal technocrat, the IP was forced to position itself on the far-left 
of New Zealand politics. The centre-right Prime Minister John Key was a figure who 
provoked great ire and anguish amongst the far left (and with Dotcom at a personal 
level), due to his historic popularity and the dramatic rise of inequality that marked his 
government. Opposing Key and New Zealand’s role in the Five Eyes would only be 
possible electorally from the left and with an emphasis on the youth vote which had 
been at historically low levels in preceding elections. To this end, Dotcom entered 
into a list-sharing agreement with the Mana Party, whose leader Hone Harawira was 
seen as a shoo-in for the Te Tai Tokerau electorate which would allow IP MPs to 
coat-tail into Parliament: the IP were unlikely to meet New Zealand’s 5% party vote 
threshold. The Mana Party’s base were the rural indigenous poor of Harawira’s 
electorate, service industry workers, campus socialists, veteran leftists and the 
remnants of Occupy. While Mana’s membership by and large supported the 
agreement, Mana lost one its most high-profile members in former Green Party MP 
Sue Bradford who was “disturbed by the idea of going into an alliance with a neo-
liberal millionaire” (Bennett 2014c). While these fissures were undeniable, the 
strength of the personalities of Harawira the populist and Dotcom the lulzy man-child 
produced a unique political spectacle which generated substantial media attention.  
Where the IP serves as a useful example of affective media politics was in its 
confluence of techno-solutionism and left-wing politics. One of Dotcom’s most 
surprising political moves was the selection of Laila Harré as the leader of his party. 
A former cabinet minister, trade-union activist and self-described “strong social 
democrat”, she told this author that it was essential for the Left to challenge “our 
assumptions about how people form their political views” (Harré 2014). Among 
Harré’s constituency of digital natives there is a “complete lack of connection to these 
previous ways [ie left/right binary] of dividing people up” (Ibid.). She believed that the 
Internet as an organising principle could harness the anti-elitism and anti-corporatism 
that would link a new youth movement and the working class “base constituency of 
social-democracy” (Ibid.). Ideological apprehension on the New Zealand Left was 
largely eclipsed by the excitement around new organisational forms, the potential for 
the affective energies of youth voters and Dotcom’s sizeable investment in the Left.  
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3. Theorising Affective Media and the Political  
This article will argue that the political potential of the Internet, new mobile 
technologies and interactive media hinge on the question of affect. While the signifier 
‘social media’ obscures the intersection of technology and capital, the term affective 
media captures specifically the ontological and political-economic logics at work. 
Affective media are not simply those that circulate the affects of online culture and 
the intimate details of users, they are a space of the production, performance and 
quantification of affect. There is a convergence of libidinal and political economies as 
our lives become enmeshed in the “pleasures of communication” (Terranova 2004, 
91) and ceaseless circuits of capital. The promise of user empowerment and new 
social worlds is what drives the affective labour of posting, sharing and consuming 
the lives of others as well as our own. Dean writes that under “communicative 
capitalism” our affective media exchanges are filled with democratic aspirations of 
“access, inclusion, discussion and participation” (2009, 4). With the rise of new media 
and tech companies as centres of economic and political power, discourses of 
affective media have become the hegemonic ideal of capitalism, labour and play.  
The theoretical foundations of this concept of affective media rest upon Lacanian 
Marxism (Žižek 1997, 2006, 2008, and Dean 2009, 2010, 2016) and discourse theory 
(Laclau 2005) which will be expounded shortly. It is first necessary to delineate the 
Deleuzian formulation of affect theory which predominates in scholarly accounts of 
new media and enjoys a popular saliency in cyber-utopian discourse. While both 
approaches ascribe “affect [as] inherently political” (Papacharissi 2015, 19), they 
differ on the question of political ontology. The difference is between a political 
subject who is marked by trauma, antagonism and the drive for enjoyment, versus a 
teleology which sees affect as a prelude to a potential radical democratic becoming. 
It is necessary to frame these two approaches as affect and new media theorists 
have posited its explanatory power in events such as Occupy and the Arab Spring. 
Brian Brown has written that “without the biopolitical influence of the subjective 
orientation of unwaged digital labourers, social movements such as Occupy Wall 
Street…would never have come to pass” (2014, 696). However, with the rise of 
Donald Trump and the alt-right’s claim to the affective subcultures of the Internet, it is 
essential to theorise the libidinal and the inter-subjective dynamics of enjoyment as 
constitutive of the political. 
Theories of affective labour, influenced by autonomist Marxism and the affect 
theory of Deleuze and Guattari, have been crucial to conceptualising the relationship 
between labour, technology, production and political potential. Hardt and Negri 
describe contemporary capitalism as driven by “networks based on communication, 
collaboration and affective relationships” (2004, 66). To be affected is concomitant 
with the ability to affect. Affect is connective and social, passing between subjects 
and “shap[ing] the surfaces of bodies and worlds” (Ahmed 2004, 121). Even as our 
social media use is captured as a new intensive form of surveillance and exploitation, 
under capitalism there is a supposed built-in contradiction to affective media. This 
alienated labour relies upon a sense of “participat[ing] in something that is bigger 
than one’s self” (Cote and Pybus 2007, 96). This might be contained to forms of 
online play, self-affirming clicktivism or one’s self-branding performances, but it 
presupposes an encounter with an other. In this way affective media labour is held to 
create an unintentional being-in-common outside of the factory, with capital 
increasingly “contradict[ing] the productivity of biopolitical labour and obstruct[ing] the 
creation of value” (Hardt and Negri 2009, 144). In Hardt and Negri’s formulation there 
is teleology which understands the concurrent developments and contradictions of 
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social, productive and technological relations as auguring their indeterminate 
revolutionary subject, the multitude.  
Affect theory and cyber-utopian discourses share a teleology of networked 
humanity best captured in the political metaphor of the “rhizome” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 7). Politics is seen as a series of micro-struggles dispersed through 
various sites of the social, with flows of intense and contagious affects bringing 
political subjects into being. Papacharissi speaks of social media’s circulation of 
affect as “activat[ing] latent ties that may be crucial to the mobilization of networked 
publics” (2015, 20). These affective energies coalesce into “interconnected, 
collaborative and cooperative…heterarchical fluid and dynamic” leaderless 
movements in the model of Occupy (B. Brown 2014, 696). Concurrent with this vision 
of social transformation is a depoliticisation of the Internet and associated 
technologies. Benkler describes new civic-minded modes of peer-production and 
produsage held as “radically decentralized, collaborative and non-proprietary” (2006, 
60). The connective tissue between Deleuzian politics and new media optimism is in 
this principle of immanent human creativity, realised and accelerated through online 
connectivity.  
This vision of politics was nicely encapsulated at the launch of the IP by Dotcom, 
who called the Internet “the most important innovation to mankind” as it “accelerates 
our evolution by allowing products to be developed…by people who share 
information online” (Internet Party 2014f). There is an important slippage here as 
connectivity becomes production and the Internet is imagined as the social space 
proper. Andrew Culp writes that in the convergence of Deleuze and cyber utopianism 
we see the conflation of connection and production obscuring the “techno-
affirmationist desire to annex everything” (2016, 64). Harré articulates these same 
ideals in her first speech as leader. For those aspiring to effect political 
transformation “the new arena is the rapidly changing internet” (Internet Party 
2014d). Harré is self-conscious of her own lack of programming skills or cyber bona 
fides and instead offers herself up as a ‘newb’ in awe of the digital natives and their 
creativity: “You will teach me more about the potential of the internet age in all of its 
complexity” (Ibid.). 
What the celebration of affect and connectivity belies is the political and contingent 
nature of affective media technologies and the role of antagonism in political identity. 
The predominant theorisation of affect and the rhizome offers no theory of political 
rupture outside “people’s natural and healthy propensity to revolt” (Laclau 2005, 243). 
The Lacanian psychoanalytic insights of Dean, Žižek and Laclau foreground the 
relational, libidinal and inner-psychic elements of affect and affective media 
production. The distinction is between a phenomenological understanding of affective 
connectivity – seen as politically productive in its own right – or antagonism as 
ontologically necessary for political identity. The political subject of affective media is 
not brought into being by the spontaneous accumulation of affects, but by the libidinal 
drive for enjoyment. At the centre of this political ontology is the Lacanian subject of 
enjoyment shaped by trauma and antagonism. Laclau’s discourse theory (2005) 
positions antagonism as the ontological precondition for rupture and social 
transformation. This is analogous to the loss of the primordial mother and Lacanian 
symbolic castration which “allows the subject to enter the symbolic order” (Žižek 
1997, 17). Political identity is shaped by the drive to recapture this lost enjoyment 
and the spectre of the ‘other’ who has taken it.  
For Laclau, antagonism and affect are coupled in the process of political 
articulation. Any properly political movement must divide the social space between 
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the political community and an enemy. In his theory of populism Laclau states that 
this community comes into being through an “affective investment in a partial object” 
(2005, 116). A signifier/name becomes overdetermined, eliciting and unifying the 
emotional energies of followers. This is the logic of Lacan’s objet petit a, where a 
signifier stands in for the primordial mother/child relationship or “the absent fullness 
of society” (Ibid., 226). Thus in the signifiers ‘Occupy’, ‘Anonymous’ or ‘Internet Party’ 
there is an affective political power which imagines a community and its enemy; 
whether ‘Big Brother’ or the ‘1%’. The IP works on the power of the signifier – ‘The 
Internet’ – as a god term eliciting other floating signifiers of cyber-utopianism: ‘Web 
2.0 democracy’, ‘citizen-consumer/prosumer’, ‘DIY’ ‘freedom/liberty’, ‘transcendence’ 
(Dahlberg 2010, 337). These affective investments are catachrestic: what is desired 
is never quite as it should be, and this displacement propels one into further affective 
drives. As an anti-essentialist, Laclau would see the battle to define ‘The Internet’ as 
a wholly reconciled social space as representative of the contingency and 
incompleteness of the social as such. 
Žižek and Laclau fundamentally differ on the question of affect and enjoyment as a 
political logic. Laclau ascribes affective investment as unfixed, standing in for the 
heterogeneity of the social space. For Žižek the problem here is that affect and 
enjoyment calcify into a fetishistic politics. Where Deleuzian affect theory 
presupposes the productivity of human connectivity, the Lacanian subject of 
psychoanalysis is insular and wracked by the presence of the other. Enjoyment is 
dependent upon the other and is never our own but is “concentrated in the other who 
stole it from us” (Žižek 1997, 43). The parasitic, overdetermined enemy cannot be 
eliminated as they are essential for enjoyment and protect the populist from 
assuming “the full ontological weight of [their] world experience” (Ibid., 60). Žižek’s 
critique of Laclau’s concept of the political and populism (2006 and 2008) centres on 
this question of a fetishistic investment in the enemy who is “reified [into] a positive 
ontological entity” (Žižek 2008, 278) necessary for the community’s enjoyment. 
 This is key to understanding how trolling functions as a defining subcultural 
practice of affective media. Brutally mocking an other is enjoyed, yet this other is an 
object of obsession and outrage. This is the obscene enjoyment of jouissance which 
is pursued for its own sake and generates both a fear of the enemy’s omnipotence 
and an enjoyment in their dehumanisation. Jouissance produces a self-fecund 
conspiratorial drive to understand the depths of the enemy’s depravity and further 
enmesh one in this fetishised circuit of enjoyment. This is precisely how cyber-
libertarians construct their enemies in the national security state as a system of 
omnipotent jouissance, from lecherous TSA agents to the spectre of NSA agents 
looking at your porn consumption, rather than a bureaucracy which embodies the 
same techno-rationalism that cyber-utopians exalt.  
Affective media should not be thought of as political in and of itself, but rather as 
simultaneously displacing and accelerating the logics of enjoyment and antagonism 
which are the precondition for political identity. The reduction of connectivity and 
creativity as the political belies the way in which affect and libidinal drives can 
become trapped in circuits of capital or explode as populist jouissance. What the 
following analysis of the IP will advance is a dialectic of affective media’s political 
potential between a left techno-democracy fetishism and the articulation of an 
antagonistic cyber-libertarian political project. The deployment of affect as a political 
strategy oscillates between enlisting partisans through a playful irreverence, the 
circular enjoyment of seemingly democratic processes, or a politics of pure 
jouissance. This is not meant as a totalising theory of affective media politics; 
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however, it is clear that the reliance on connectivity does not overcome the 
deadlocks of 20th century emancipatory leftist thought. Dean’s work on the 
communist party as an “affective infrastructure” (2016, 291) might be better suited to 
formulating affect within a radical left politics but is beyond the scope of this article. 
4. Trolling and the LULZ 
The IP’s strategy to mobilise the youth and digital natives was to channel affective 
online cultures in offering a new irreverent politics fusing technological innovation and 
‘the LULZ’. This is implicit in the signifier ‘Internet’, which in addition to the righteous 
affirmation of cyber-utopianism signals the affective pleasures of identification. The 
IP campaign was staked on melding its serious message with the spirit of lulzy 
irreverence and nerd culture which defines the ‘weird Internet’ of Twitter, Reddit and 
4chan. Whether through the use of cats in promotional material, because nothing is 
more ‘Internet’ than cats, the national concert series emceed by Dotcom or the 
party’s online videos, the IP’s ‘serious’ message was delivered through affect. The 
party’s televised opening campaign statement features a Jetsons-style retro-futurism 
in which the IP usher in prosperity, environmental stability, cyber-protection, 
“awesomely radical hoverboards and talking cats, because futuristic reasons!” 
(Internet Mana Party 2014). The comedic mechanism of the “because reasons” 
meme is exemplary of the circularity of affect as a political logic. The popular blog-
writing style of turning “because” into a noun is supposed to function as an 
“explanation that maximizes efficiency and irony in equal measure” (Garber 2013). 
The non sequitur “because futuristic reasons” is a meme folded into itself that is 
symbolically efficient on the basis of an affective investment in ‘The Internet’. Self-
parody and sincerity sit side-by-side. The key insight is that there is no gap between 
the affective pleasures of political identity and programmatic ideological content. 
Belief in techno-solutionism and cyber-utopianism provide a form of enjoyment and 
the affective energies for political/antagonistic articulation. 
In identifying the affective community of the Internet it is necessary to delineate an 
other as an object of ridicule and enjoyment. The IP’s political enemies are, 
predictably, arms of the security state, John Key, the American government and what 
Dotcom calls the “copyright cartel” who try “take control and monopolize all of human 
thought” (Keiser 2016). While there are burning political discussions to be had about 
state surveillance, New Zealand’s geo-political alliances, intellectual property and 
what the digital commons might look like, these enemies, in IP discourse, serve as 
objects of jouissance. America is a potent signifier of indeterminate evils in IP 
discourse, eliciting the battle cry of “let’s take this country back from the Americans!”  
(Ryan 2014). The populist binary of fear and enjoyment is rendered perfectly in a 
series of IP videos entitled “Bedtime Stories With the GCSB” (Internet Party, 2014g). 
The videos are intended as a satire of Masterpiece Theatre and feature readings of 
Greenwald’s severe prose on state surveillance: “[Five Eyes] is devoted to one 
overarching mission to prevent the slightest piece of electronic communication from 
evading its systemic grasp”. The video contains a subliminal jump cut of the ‘Great 
Seal of the United States’ before concluding with a sign-off: “sleep tight New 
Zealand, be safe and remember wherever and whoever you are the GCSB is there 
too”. The dissonance between the paternalism of a public broadcaster and 
government that watches you when you sleep is meant to be humorous, but it is 
precisely what is elicited in their concept of surveillance as bureaucratic jouissance. 
America’s omnipotence or manipulation is light-heartedly compared to conspiracies 
of the Illuminati and the new-world-order, yet this is how the IP conceive their enemy. 
344     Olivier Jutel 
CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2017. 
The affective media practice of trolling exemplifies the circular logic of jouissance; 
obsessing over and mocking the enemy becomes an end in and of itself. Phillips’ 
study of ‘troll’ subcultures emphasises a Bergsonian “affective gap” (2015, 35) 
between offensive trolling content and its dispassionate delivery. It is this dissonance 
which sustains online subcultures as a place of play. However in the IP’s Illuminati 
conception of the enemy there is no ironic distance, in spite of the lulz enjoyed in this 
caricature. Some theorists have turned to the hacker group Anonymous as an 
example of how the affective drive for lulz can be sublimated into “the pursuit of a 
rational political goal” (Stoehrel and Lindgren 2014, 257). Yet whatever progressive 
outcomes may be achieved by the lulz of obscene enjoyment, jouissance has its own 
logic. In Gabriella Coleman’s 2014 book on Anonymous, the notorious white 
supremacist hacker ‘weev’ is profiled as an archetypal troll concerned only for the 
lulz, which Coleman sees ultimately as a “principled weapon” of resistance (50). For 
Coleman, the world of racism, misogyny and snuff that hackers inhabit is the 
shocking carnivalesque which gives trolling its subversive power. The obvious 
mistake here is failing to take jouissance and weev at face value. The so called alt-
right have perfected the use of affective media as a political tactic in mobilising 
behind Donald Trump as an avatar of pure vulgar jouissance. The alt-right even 
mirror the affect determinism of cyber-utopianism with their concept of ‘meme magic’. 
The logic of trolling exemplifies the other’s role in enjoyment as both an object of 
derision and obsession. Enemies are a source of enjoyment to be ‘triggered’ with 
heinous provocations, while still plaguing the alt-right with thoughts of political 
correctness on campus, or pure racist nightmares of miscegenation and sexual 
enjoyment.  
Kim Dotcom was foregrounded in the IP campaign as an avatar of lulz trolling the 
Prime Minister. A key part of his biography on the campaign was his claim to have 
hacked NASA at the age of 19 to see if aliens existed (Ryan 2014); in other words, 
‘he did it for the lulz’. Additionally his garish lifestyle, his world #1 ranking in Call of 
Duty and his status as a self-produced electronic dance music DJ made him a star 
attraction on the IP Road Trip. Dotcom’s musical catalogue typifies what politics the 
lulz undergirds 2 . Dotcom’s lulzy irreverence has also seen him flirt with Nazi 
iconography, having been photographed wearing an SS helmet and owning an 
autographed first-edition copy of Mein Kampf. Dotcom stated that the photo was a 
joke, that the book was a lucrative investment and that as a Call of Duty player he 
clearly has an interest in history (Bennett 2014a). While Dotcom is not weev, the 
fascination with an ahistorical Nazism is key to the moral absolutism of the 
cyberlibertarian struggle with state power. Leaving no doubt about the narcissism 
and hysteria common to this politics, Dotcom has subsequently claimed that his 
treatment at the hands of America, colluding with Jewish Hollywood moguls, was 
akin to Nazism (Dotcom 2015).  
The centrality of Dotcom to the campaign is owed to his relationship with John Key 
as the Prime Minister and minister for the GCSB. The two exchanged jabs during 
Dotcom’s testimony to a parliamentary select committee and Dotcom was 
instrumental in transforming the PM into a populist enemy and target of derision. 
While in historical terms the neo-liberal PM has simply maintained the status quo of 
previous governments’ security arrangements with Five Eyes, he was routinely 
panned as a puppet and sycophantic bootlicker of the American empire, particularly 
                                            
2 The song “Live my Life” (Dotcom, 2012) follows a nerd through gratuitous soft porn fantasies of 
hyper-masculinity, while the $24 million video “Good Life” (Dotcom, 2016), described by Dotcom as his 
life’s work, is a display of pure hedonistic opulence. 
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in the bizarre ‘Project Manifesto’ party video (Internet Party 2014c). This jouissance 
burst into the national discourse with the release of the infamous “Fuck John Key!” 
video. Initially published on the party’s YouTube page, the video captured the lulz 
and the role of Dotcom as troll. Dotcom addressed a frenzied crowd in Christchurch, 
promising to lead a “revolution”, and “extradite” John Key (Internet Mana Party 
2014b). The concert-goers then proceeded to chant “Fuck John Key” while Dotcom 
held a cardboard cut-out of Key. What is striking about this incident is the emptiness 
of the term ‘revolution’. Only a deeply ahistorical reading of Key allows one to 
entertain the notion that the IP’s cyberlibertarianism represents anything close to 
revolution. While Dotcom positions himself as master of the lulz for the universal 
principles of ‘the Internet’, we simply have jouissance deployed at the figure Dotcom 
holds responsible for destroying his business and seizing his property (Bennett 
2014b).  
5. Techno-Democracy Fetish 
Theorising affective media ontology, we encounter a dialectic between techno-
humanist teleologies of democracy and the reality of the political, lulz and populism. 
To understand how depoliticisation and ideological misrecognition are built into 
affective media practices it is necessary to consider Dean’s notion of 
“Communicative Capitalism” as a convergence point of libidinal and political 
economies. Affective media draws on the anxieties and pleasures of communication 
and commensurate incessant loops of surveillance capital. In the pursuit of rationalist 
Habermasian communicative action and consensus, we are forever caught in the 
Lacanian intersubjective dynamics of enjoyment: ‘What did the other mean? What did 
the other see in me? Are they trolling me?’. The affective investment in virtual 
democracy produces a hyper-activity in pursuit of pure communication, consensus 
and taxonomical politics. In this way, virtual democracy is depoliticisation “extend[ing] 
affective networks without encouraging – and indeed, by displacing – their 
consolidation into organized political networks” (Dean 2010a, 42). Techno-mediated 
communication becomes a fetish which “covers over a fundamental lack or absence 
in the social order…[and] the ‘fix’ lets us think that all we need is to extend a 
particular technology and we will have a democratic or reconciled social order” (Dean 
2009, 38). At the height of this techno-fetishism, subjects are interpassive: we 
behave as if we are active but the “technological fetish ‘is political’ for us, enabling us 
to go about the rest of our lives relieved of the guilt that we might not be doing our 
part” (Ibid., 37). 
The IP offered techno-solutions to questions of democracy, governance and party 
structure which appealed to an Occupy-inspired left. While ‘democracy’ surfaces 
frequently in IP discourse, it fits within the rhetoric of the sharing economy, NGOs 
and social enterprises where ‘democracy’ is akin to good corporate governance. At 
the party’s launch, Dotcom announced that the IP would embody “truly democratic 
processes that no other party has…[a] crowd sourc[ing] policy” allowing members to 
collaborate (Internet Party 2014e). The IP’s notion of radical democratic party 
processes also included the gamification of candidate selection, as members 
performed in an American Idol-style spectacle, with winning candidates standing for 
office. The IP’s policy on “Responsive Government” promised a one-stop “democracy 
portal” that would allow citizens to vote online and collect signatures for binding 
citizen-initiated referenda (2014a). It promised to modernise and save money on 
government services through the use of open-source software, and tap in to problem-
solving start-up culture through public hackathons and app challenges (Ibid.). In spite 
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of Occupy rhetoric, the IP’s tech-disruption of politics equates democratic citizenship 
with the autonomous neo-liberal digital subject. The IP’s governance policy aligns 
with the neo-liberal rubric of “right-sizing government”, reducing “welfare 
dependence” and providing better service to business (Ibid., 5-10).  
The techno-fetishist rhetoric of democracy reached its apogee in partnering with 
Loomio to launch the IP’s policy incubator. Loomio is a conferencing app developed 
by members of Occupy Wellington, and modelled on the Occupy general assembly. 
The app allows members to advance proposals, block or approve them, abstain or 
counter-propose. Prominent cyber-utopian theorist Douglas Rushkoff served as a 
mentor and booster of the Loomio project, declaring it the killer-app for democracy 
(Rushkoff 2014). Loomio creator Ben Knight explained the power of this techno-fix to 
democracy at a TEDx talk through the testimony of a Brazilian protester who wrote to 
him:  
 
Your software seems to be exactly what we need right now…to give us 
the space we need to transform our dreams into concrete action. To help 
us re-learn how democracy is made: through engaged discussion and 
informed participation (Knight, 2013). 
 
The fetish of democracy transposes the hard work of the political ideology and the 
division of the social onto software that enacts radical democracy without threatening 
the autonomy of neo-liberal digital subjects in the quest for pure communication and 
consensus. The techno-democracy fetish creates an endless discussion, reinforcing 
the virtues of communicative capitalism while infiltrating the everyday and colonising 
our dreams of democracy. 
The IP’s policy incubator was a demonstration of how the horizontalist notion of 
communication and “structurelessness” becomes a “way of masking power” 
(Freeman 1973, 6). The sole policy achievement of the incubator was initiating a 
conversation on medical marijuana and decriminalisation, later turned into policy. As 
a party whose raison d’etre was youth mobilisation and opposing state power, this is 
hardly controversial policy. What this consensus-forming exercise produces is the 
affective communicative energy sustaining the myth of the ‘crowd-sourced’ policy and 
the fantasy of techno-democracy. In a candid interview with the present author, 
Vikram Kumar, the former CEO of Dotcom’s Mega and the CEO of the IP, was asked 
whether the incubator delivered tangible outcomes, to which he gave a decidedly 
realist answer: “I think people have this concept that somehow you crowd-source 
policies, or you put up a topic and magically people will come up with the best 
answers; it doesn’t work that way” (Kumar 2014).  
Kumar continued that in practical terms Loomio puts the party in conversation 
with its members and gauges their various interests. The policy incubator is simply 
an online version of the focus group approach that defines modern professional 
post-politics, turning ideological positions into data points. It is telling that Kumar was 
named CEO of the party while party president. A tech-elitism was enshrined in the 
party constitution where Dotcom was officially titled ‘party visionary’, meaning that he 
could not be removed from the executive position by party members (R. Brown 
2014). The party’s assets were placed in a shell company, administered by the party 
secretary as an employee of the company not answerable to party members (Ibid.). 
It is apparent that the IP’s use of Loomio is about displacing politics, using the 
democracy fetish to placate a leftist sensibility as part of a well-resourced, 
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professional political attempt to steer young people towards the class project of 
cyberlibertarianism.  
6. Cyberlibertarianism  
Behind the indeterminacy of affective media signifiers and the techno-democracy 
fetish lies the class project of cyberlibertarianism. The rhetoric of decentralisation 
masks new forms of control that allow tech-capital to extract affective labour. While 
this might seem an intolerable hypocrisy, the exaltation of digital liberty lays the 
groundwork for neo-liberal individualism and autonomy. Freedom online becomes the 
“freedom to consume through financial payment …and freely choosing to give away 
your labour to corporations in exchange for non-monetary opportunities and benefits” 
(Dahlberg 2010, 340). Cyberlibertarianism deploys the metaphor of a global frontier, 
with all the rugged individualism this entails. However, the libertarian critique of 
corporate inauthenticity offers the Left the promise of “replacing corporate capitalism 
and big government with a high-tech gift economy” (Barbrook and Cameron 1996, 6) 
through the free flow of information and superior modes of exchange such as Bitcoin. 
The IP championed this vision of freedom explicitly in its governance and economic 
policy statements, and Dotcom himself characterised his company Mega as part of 
the rhizomatic infrastructure of Internet freedom. In cyberlibertarian discourse we 
have the melding of commercial imperatives and idealism which channels “leftist 
political energies into the service of the political far right” (Golumbia 2013, 3).  
Cyberlibertarianism is not merely leftist confusion and manipulation by tech capital: 
in true populist form there is a moral piety which masks a dystopian elitism and 
libidinal investment in techno-mastery. Golumbia identifies in cyberlibertarianism a 
Hobbesian view of individual power over and above civil society as the basis for 
sovereignty (2009, 192-196). In the political interventions of tech-capital, hackers and 
anonymity-activists there is a belief that “unsolved problems simply indicate that 
nobody as smart as they are has come along to solve those problems; that domain-
specific knowledge is a kind of ‘elitism’ meant to keep out true experts like them” 
(Golumbia 2015, 125). We can see this in the ‘techno-solutionism’ which informs the 
IP’s policies of ICT-driven education, promotion of digital currencies, the software-
centric view of the economy and the aspiration to become “the world’s start-up 
incubator” (Internet Party, 2014b). With this naïve faith in tech comes a belief in 
“spontaneous order” (Golumbia 2013, 6) brought about through the hacker-ethos of 
disruption. The hacker may bypass “anything that gets in the way of the individual” 
(Ibid., 15) whether barriers to information or accountable political processes, as they 
attempt to liberate institutional knowledge for the netizenry.  
One of the great achievements of cyberlibertarianism is the ubiquity of the hacking 
metaphor: from life-hacks to food-hacks to politics. There is an individualism that is 
hostile to the traditional mass politics of the Left and holds an ambiguous relationship 
to tech capital, as besting the tech establishment allows hackers to “promote 
themselves as the most effective and most highly-skilled candidates for employment” 
(Golumbia 2013, 15). Individualism aside, there is a libidinal logic of power “inspir[ing] 
dreams of individual domination and mastery, of a self so big that no other selves 
would be necessary” (2009, 184). Beyond the nominally left tech-fetishism of virtual 
democracy, cyberlibertarianism offers individual transcendence of the social with 
computer mastery proving “sexually satisfying to the adolescent who already feels 
estranged from human social relations” (Ibid., 187). The hacker is trapped within the 
fetishistic logic of jouissance, deriving pleasure and superiority from computer 
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mastery while continually reencountering the failure of this “relation between the self 
and ordinary people” (206). 
As a populist politics of jouissance, cyberlibertarianism vacillates between the 
moral piety of the digital community and a dystopian distrust of the masses. In his 
examination of the politics of Anonymous, Goode identifies the split between 
utopia/dystopia and nihilism/idealism (2015). Goode describes a cultish language of 
religious awakening crossed with The Matrix that would not be out of place on the 
Glenn Beck show: 
 
“All your life you have known that something is not right with this world. 
You can FEEL it in your heart. We all can. Anonymous is here to re-
align the people with the truth.” (Goode 2015, 81.) 
 
Goode writes that “these pious tones could be dismissed as the humorous echoes of 
films such as V for Vendetta and The Matrix” (Ibid.). Whatever lulz are gained from 
the appropriation of nerd fan cultures and a comic book morality, there is no ironic 
distance between jouissance and super-hero fantasies. Dotcom was routinely 
introduced at IP events as “New Zealand’s newest Superhero” (Ryan 2014). Indeed, 
Edward Snowden has stated that his political awakening was born of video games, 
where “an ordinary person finds himself faced with grave injustice from powerful 
forces and has the choice to flee or fight for his beliefs” (Kakutani 2014). 
Cyberlibertarians may well consider their struggle as the fight against “abject 
slavery”, “the nightmarish vision of 1984” and “the new world order” (Anonymous, 
quoted in Goode 2015, 82) but this struggle is too important to be trusted to the 
masses. As an individualistic politics of jouissance, there is a non-dialectical view of 
power in moral absolutist terms, oscillating between hero-worship and hysterical 
disempowering dystopianism. The model of hacker politics here is not unlike the 
culture jammer that dismisses the public as “totally programmed by the culture of the 
spectacle” (Haiven 2007, 87), i.e. trapped in the Matrix and so therefore an enemy. 
The hacker or culture jammer is free to act out their personal emancipation with no 
need to “be critically and reflexively scrutinized for their effectiveness or participation 
in broader forms of oppression” (Ibid., 98). The hacker doesn’t need politics or 
ideology, but simply submits to the logic of information, taking no responsibility for 
anything beyond revealing a truth which the public may or may not choose to accept.  
7. Moment of Truth 
The IP’s “Moment of Truth” was the culmination of a highly-managed professional 
political campaign, crystallising the politics of cyberlibertarianism. The event was 
promoted two months in advance and promised a “political bombshell” (Manning 
2014) five days before the election. Beyond the notion of disruption inherent in this 
political unmasking or ‘September Surprise’, this was a clear end-run around 
conventional politics. The event sought to bypass professional journalism while 
simultaneously managing the spectacle in line with the superficial media values that 
the party is supposedly critical of. Delaying the release of the information also 
allowed the IP to assemble a star-studded billing of cyberlibertarian heroes. Glenn 
Greenwald was announced, with the promise of revealing damning evidence of the 
Key government’s complicity in mass domestic surveillance. Greenwald chose not to 
work with New Zealand journalists prior to the event, in spite of the experience of 
exemplary journalists like Nicky Hager, who first exposed Five Eyes to the world in 
1995, or Andrea Vance, who broke the story of the GCSB’s illegal spying and was 
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herself subjected to government surveillance. Whatever the merits of Greenwald’s 
reporting, there is a hacker’s sensibility that the local context for journalism and 
politics are inconsequential in the face of Snowden’s powerful, disruptive information. 
It is this elitism and dismissal of national specificity that allowed Key to deflect 
Greenwald’s reporting, appealing to the public that Greenwald was simply Dotcom’s 
“little henchman” (Trevett 2014). 
The principal effect of the MOT event was to position Dotcom, the IP and the New 
Zealand elections as part of the universal struggle for Internet freedom. Harré 
introduced the meeting as “a symbol of democracy for the whole world…courtesy of 
the internet itself” (Moment of Truth 2014). Fittingly, the giants of cyberlibertarianism 
Julien Assange and Edward Snowden joined by video-link. Each offered their sombre 
assessment of current mass government surveillance and entreated the New 
Zealand public to end mass surveillance. Greenwald used NSA documents to show 
that Key’s government intended to tap the Southern Cross cable, and Snowden 
claimed first-hand knowledge of New Zealand’s participation in the NSA XKeyscore 
program, as well as the existence of two NSA offices inside New Zealand. While 
these are very newsworthy claims, they were undone by a cyberlibertarian 
condescension. Greenwald’s performance mirrored the IP’s campaign by turning Key 
into a figure of contempt. He gleefully mocked Key, to Dotcom’s unrestrained 
laughter and the delight of his audience, while emphasising his own altruistic 
motives. He referred to Key’s media attacks as “the most adolescent epithets 
imaginable” (Ibid.):  
 
I guess in some warped way New Zealanders should feel blessed to be 
led by a person who has completely unburdened himself…I mean he 
has no dignity or statesmanlike behaviour…I never thought I would 
actually hear myself saying…“I’m not going to lower myself to the prime 
minister’s level”[Laughter]. (Ibid.)  
 
Greenwald attacks the notion that he is endorsing the IP as a conspiracy “so frivolous 
that nobody could say it with a straight face”, yet at the same time states that he is 
“thrilled” that Dotcom is funding the party and is “really proud” to participate in MOT 
as a “pure affirmation” of his role as a journalist (Ibid.). This apparent contradiction 
can only be reconciled by a cyberlibertarian notion of information as over-and-above 
politics. As the gatekeeper of Snowden’s NSA documents, Greenwald’s intervention 
is virtuous by default and requires no consideration of national specificity as 
Greenwald states in defence of his motives: “I have spent very little time studying the 
domestic political disputes that take place in New Zealand” (Ibid.). 
Greenwald’s most remarkable rhetorical flourish, in defence of his journalistic 
ethics, neatly evinces the utopian/dystopian binary and cyberlibertarian piety. The 
derision of Key reaches a crescendo in Greenwald’s characterisation of the 
pathological enemy: 
 
People who make accusations about other people’s hidden corrupt 
motives are actually saying very little about the people they’re accusing 
but saying a great deal about themselves. Because what those people 
are saying, the people who spew those kind of accusations, is, “I cannot 
believe that anybody would do anything out of a sense of duty or 
principle. They must be doing it for some corrupt reason.” And the reason 
they think that is because they themselves never do anything out of 
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conviction or principle. And so they believe that everybody else is plagued 
by the same pathology of soullessness that plagues them (Ibid.). 
 
The populist formulation is clear; the enemy and mass surveillance are understood in 
a Manichean language we might associate with the religious right. The enemy is 
“plagued” by a fundamental corruption and “pathology of soullessness” which can be 
called jouissance. And just as this jouissance marks the enemy as irredeemable, 
Greenwald and Dotcom can imagine themselves as real moral agents acting out of “a 
sense of duty or principle”3. 
MOT proved a debacle not simply because of a cyberlibertarian jouissance and 
derision, but also Dotcom’s failure to produce his smoking gun. His revelation was to 
be an email from a Hollywood executive discussing with John Key a plan to entrap 
Dotcom; however, the email could not be independently verified. Without his big 
reveal, Dotcom was left on stage in his familiar role as lulzy cheerleader laughing at 
Greenwald’s jokes and ‘whoo’-ing into his live microphone. At the conclusion of 
Snowden’s and Assange’s talks he gave his only substantive contribution of the 
evening:  
 
There are two ways to fight mass surveillance. Number one is 
politically....Number two, with technology. ‘Encryption’ is the key word 
…what you have witnessed tonight is quite extraordinary because both 
Julian and Edward have been connected to us using our new Mega 
communication suite, which is a fully encrypted videoconferencing 
solution. So I am really passionate about keeping everybody’s status 
safe. Not only can you transfer files completely privately and securely 
through Mega, you can also communicate with a Skype-like client on 
steroids completely safe and web based (Ibid.). 
 
Presented as a public intervention in New Zealand politics, the big reveal at MOT 
was Dotcom’s cyberlibertarian conflation of freedom and human rights with private 
profit. Whatever insights the public may have gained about the question of 
government surveillance were eclipsed by Dotcom’s product launch and self-
congratulatory techno-solutionism, endorsed by Assange and Snowden, who 
appeared on-screen with the Mega watermark. Self-interest aside, the political 
solution of encryption is a form of tech-fetishism that both fails on its own terms and 
perpetuates the cyber-libertarian view of state power4.  
8. Conclusion 
The formation of the Internet Party was premised upon key notions of affective media 
politics. Their campaign was to unlock the irrepressible sociality of Web 2.0 with new 
political and economic potential from hackathons, crowd-sourced policies and a 
                                            
3 This pronouncement is truly remarkable when we consider that Greenwald’s exclusive access to the 
Snowden files has been leveraged to secure a $250 million investment from eBay founder and 
cyberlibertarian guru Pierre Omidyar to create First Look Media and The Intercept (Ames, 2013a). The 
cyberlibertarian conflation of private interests with virtue is transparent in the privatisation of the 
Snowden files by Greenwald, in conjunction with a Silicon Valley oligarch whose company boasts of 
routinely sharing its customers’ information with law enforcement without a subpoena or warrant 
(Ames, 2013b). 
4  Yasha Levine’s journalism on the Tor Project is exemplary here as Tor both fails the test of 
encryption and disavows its government funding and role as a soft power mechanism in US foreign 
policy (2015a and 2015b).   
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youthful tech-connected constituency. The battle for a libertarian Internet was pitched 
as a universal struggle that rhizomatically realized an autonomous movement 
overcoming the challenges of traditional mass politics and ideology. The IP 
positioned itself within the left of New Zealand politics and appealed to the 
democratic proceduralism of Occupy, yet there were clear signs of a techno-elitism 
behind the rhetoric of the rhizome. What affective media has wrought in the IP is a 
populist politics of jouissance which conceals the class project of cyberlibertarianism.  
What was new and expressly political in IP discourse was the centrality of affect 
and lulz in its political strategy. Affective media enables a collective experience of 
enjoyment which is critical to what Laclau would term an antagonistic discursive 
articulation. The IP was able to create a political identity of irreverent enjoyment with 
no gap between the ‘serious’ message of cyber-utopianism and a lulzy internet-
subcultural identity. While affect can be political, the potential for a populist fetishism 
is clear. Correlative to the IP’s political identity is a rapacious enemy of jouissance, 
described in conspiratorial Illuminati-esque terms of omnipotence and pathological 
soullessness, whose own perverted enjoyment threatens the group. It is this populist 
fetishism which explains the IP’s ahistorical and overwrought view of state 
surveillance. It also allows Dotcom the ability to troll John Key as a figure of contempt 
and claim his own libertarian self-interest as some manner of revolutionary idealism.  
While there has been excitement in academic and left-wing circles about the ability 
of affective media and techno-solutions to enable new democratic processes, the IP’s 
version of the ‘new’ masks the power of the tech-oligarchy. The party’s corporate 
governance, Dotcom’s ‘visionary’ status, and undemocratic internal processes clearly 
indicate that Dotcom’s self-interest overrides the party membership. The use of the 
Occupy-inspired Loomio’s policy incubator corresponds precisely to Dean’s notion of 
techno-fetishism whereby hyper-activity, proceduralism and the quest for an 
impossible pure discourse replaces direct political action. While appealing to a left-
sensibility of new politics the policy incubator was simply a means to focus-group its 
membership in a manner typical of conventional professional politics.  
Where affective political energies were realised for ideologically substantive 
politics, this was in the service of cyberlibertarianism. Dotcom is able to conflate the 
struggle for digital liberty with the rights of tech-capital and his business to be free of 
government interference. Despite the semblance of left-wing notions like democracy, 
sharing and the commons, cyberlibertarianism is a politics of radical capitalist 
individualism with an extreme right-wing view of government and the masses. The 
model of political action is the hacker as pious superhero, an autonomous individual 
whose superiority licenses all manner of disruption and political interventions. There 
is a libidinal investment in technical mastery as overcoming the irrationality of the 
social world and the inevitable dystopian anger when the public fail to yield to 
individual greatness. 
The Moment of Truth was a precisely cyberlibertarian political intervention 
combining journalistic insights with a management of political spectacle aimed at 
vaulting Dotcom to the pantheon of cyberlibertarian heroes while using Snowden and 
Assange to ‘launch’ his new product. This end run around journalism and the public 
failed spectacularly, as Dotcom was unable to produce his smoking gun. Greenwald 
and Dotcom’s derision of the unprecedentedly popular prime minister may have 
produced lulz for the IP’s constituency, but it hardened the general public against the 
party. Support for the Internet Mana list collapsed from a high of 4%, with five 
potential MPs, to a polling day low of 1.26%, leaving them outside of parliament 
(TVNZ 2014). While this political intervention may not have dented Dotcom’s 
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credibility in cyberlibertarian circles, the lessons for left-wing enthusiasts of affective 
media politics are clear. The Mana Party of left-radicals and the indigenous rural 
poor, who entered parliament through traditional organising, campaigning and left-
wing solidarity, were decimated and discredited by this techno-democracy gambit.  
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